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Introduction
The concept of moral rights embraces the theory that an artistic
work represents the personality of the artist. As such, artistic work de-
serves protection in addition to the economic rights given artists under
the Copyright Act of 1976.1 The passage of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 19902 (VARA) on December 1, 1990, marked a significant ad-
vance in the recognition and protection of the moral rights of a segment
of American artists. Until the passage of VARA, if an artist were fortu-
nate enough to live in a state that had a moral rights statute, she could
rely on that to protect her moral rights. Otherwise, the artist had to pro-
tect her moral rights through various legal mechanisms, such as § 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, 3 the doctrine of misappropriation, or the common-
law doctrine of unfair competition.
Eleven states have legislation that protects the right of attribution
and the right of respect-the two basic rights that comprise moral
rights.4 New York and California, generally recognized as the centers of
the arts in the United States, are two such states. In 1979, California
became the first state to enact moral rights legislation, but the statute
protected only works "of recognized quality."5 In 1984, New York en-
acted the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act, but the Act primar-
ily attempted to protect an artist's reputation.6
The actual rights accorded artists, as well as the subject matter pro-
tected, vary among the states. In addition, state protection is not the
same as the protection under VARA. A comparison between VARA's
provisions and state moral rights statutes underscores the superiority of
state statutes in many instances. VARA protects a limited subset of
copyrightable works of art. State statutes, on the other hand, increase
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976).
2. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 104 Stat. 5089,
5128-33 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 506 (Supp. III 1992)).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988).
4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s to -l16t
(West 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2152-:2156 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
27, § 303 (West 1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 598.970-.978 (Michie 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1992); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-2 to -3 (Michie 1992); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.01, 14.03
(McKinney 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-2110 (Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-
62-2 to -6 (1991).
5. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(b)(2).
6. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-14.5 (McKinney 1992); Edward J. Damich,
The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1733, 1741 (1984) ("Clearly, the thrust of the New York statute is more toward protection of
the artist's reputation than toward protection of the work.").
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the categories of protected works and protected subrights under the two
basic moral rights of attribution and respect.
I
Kinds of Work Protected
By enacting VARA, Congress acknowledged the need to protect the
rights of attribution and respect while continuing to protect the rights of
copyright owners and users.' VARA's purpose is "to preserve and pro-
tect certain limited categories of works of visual art that exist in single
copies or in limited editions." Protected works include a single painting,
a drawing, a print, a sculpture, a signed still photographic image pro-
duced for exhibition, and limited editions of these works that number 200
or fewer, which are signed and consecutively numbered.9 VARA specifi-
cally excludes works that are protected under the 1976 Copyright Act' °
in the categories of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works," "audiovi-
sual works," and "literary works.""1
In marked contrast to VARA's definition of protected works, some
state statutory definitions of "fine art" cover an extraordinarily broad
range of artistic creations. For example, the Connecticut statute's defini-
tion of "work of fine art" includes works of calligraphy, works of graphic
art, works of mixed media, photographs (without restriction), craft
works in clay and masters from which copies can be made.12 Similarly,
Massachusetts and New Mexico enacted broad definitions of "fine art"
which, in some aspects, extend beyond the definition in the Connecticut
statute. In addition to original works of visual and graphic art, these
three states include audio or video tapes, films, holograms, or any combi-
nation of works of recognized quality.' 3
However, states that give rights generously with one hand, restrict
rights with the other. One vexing restraint on the scope of protected
artistic works is the requirement that the work be of "recognized qual-
7. "The Visual Artists Rights title is very sensitive to the concerns of the copyright com-
munity that the bill not inadvertently impact on important business activities." 136 CONG.
REC. S16302-08 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
8. 136 CONG. REC. E3716-17 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of the Hon. Carlos J.
Moorhead) (emphasis added).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
10. "A work of visual art does not include- (A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, techni-
cal drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book,
magazine, newspaper, periodical, database, electronic information service, electronic publica-
tion, or similar publication." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
11. Id.
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s(2).
13. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B).
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ity." Five of the eleven state statutes contain this qualification.' 4 These
states require members of the art community to make such an assessment
of quality when the need arises.II Under VARA, however, the standards
of the artistic community only determine whether the work falls within
the statutory definition, and are not used to assess the work's quality. 6
State statutes which limit moral rights protection to those artistic works
that are of "recognized quality" emphasize a policy choice to protect
works of public interest over the individual artist's right to personality in
general.
Although VARA does not use a "quality" characteristic to classify
artistic creations, it does specify that an artist has a right to prevent the
destruction of a work of "recognized stature."' 7 Arguably, a work of
"recognized stature" may not be a work of "recognized quality,"'" but
the underlying policy rationale for the qualification is basically the
same-to designate specific works for preservation due to public interest.
In fact, those states that do not place quality limitations on protected art
work do not grant a subright against destruction within the right of
respect. 9
VARA also narrows the scope of protected subject matter by includ-
ing in the definition of "works of visual art" limited editions of 200 cop-
ies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered.2 ° In contrast to
VARA, six state statutes have a limited edition provision that includes
copies of 300 or fewer.2 ' The state statutes seem to protect more kinds of
works, but the extent of that protection is unclear under the preemption
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 85S(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102.
15. The determination of the work's quality attributes rests on the opinions of artists, art
dealers, curators of art museums, collectors of fine art, and other persons involved with the
creation or the marketing of fine art.
16. "The courts should use common sense and generally accepted standards of the artistic
community in determining whether a particular work falls within the scope of the definition."
H.R. REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990).
17. "(3) [S]ubject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), [the author of a work of
visual art] shall have the right .. .(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized
stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that
right." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 43, 44.
19. Louisiana, however, places a "recognized quality" restriction on the scope of pro-
tected works, although it does not provide for protection against destruction. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:2152(4).
20. The definition also includes limited editions of multiple cast, carved, or fabricated
sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signa-
ture or other identifying mark of the author. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
21. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(1)(D); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.970(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-3(e); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 14.03(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2(e).
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doctrine.22 Because VARA will preempt a state statute if a court deter-
mines that the statute covers the same subject matter as VARA, the ques-
tion is whether a limited edition of 200 or fewer copies is a single and
distinct category from a limited edition of 300 or fewer copies, or alterna-
tively, whether the copies numbered 201 through 300 fall outside the
scope of the subject matter embodied in VARA. Resolution of this issue
will determine whether the state statutes actually provide more protec-
tion under VARA.
The primary advantage of the state moral rights statutes over
VARA is the protection of reproduction. The six states that include lim-
ited edition provisions also include the right to prevent unfaithful repro-
ductions.2 3 Section 106A(a)(1)(2) of VARA, however, expressly denies
any protection for reproductions. 24  VARA's stated rationale for ex-
pressly excluding reproductions of "works of fine art" is that the artist
has less personal contact with reproductions than she has with limited
editions.25 Under this theory, reproductions are perceived as possessing
less of the artist's personality because of the diminished contact with the
artist; consequently, reproductions deserve less protection. Despite this
purported loss of personality, the inclusion of reproductions as protected
subject matter is a strength of the state statutes that is clearly missing
from VARA.26
The commercial use exception is another subject that is treated dif-
ferently by VARA and the state moral rights statutes. All but two of the
state statutes contain an exception for commercial use, advertising, or
22. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
23. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.974(l); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 14.03(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3.
24. "The rights described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not apply to any
reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection with
any item described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of the definition of "work of visual art" in
section 101 .... " 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (emphasis added).
25. "The bill recognizes the special value inherent in the original or limited edition copy
of a work of art. The original or few copies with which the artist was most in contact embody
the artist's 'personality' far more closely than subsequent mass produced images. Accordingly,
the physical existence of the original itself possesses an importance independent from any com-
munication of its contents by means of copies." The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1989: Hear-
ings on H.R. Rep. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1989)
(statement of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg).
26. See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (rec-
ognition that deliberate alteration of a reproduction of an artist's work can harm the reputa-
tion of an artist and distort the public's perception of the artist's viewpoint); see also Damich,
supra note 6, at 1738-39.
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trade use." California and Nevada take the same approach as VARA;
their definitions of "fine art" exclude works prepared under contract for
commercial use by the purchaser.28 Other states protect works of fine art
created under contract if the contract expressly reserves the substantive
rights.29 Connecticut takes a different approach with respect to commis-
sioned works. Under Connecticut's statutory definition of a "work of
fine art," commissioned works prepared under contract for trade or ad-
vertising use receive complete protection, unless prior to the creation of
the work the artist signed an agreement that the work may be altered
without consent.3°
VARA's definition of "work of visual art" expressly excludes works
made for hire. A work made for hire consists of two distinct categories:
1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her em-
ployment, and 2) specified commissioned works. 31 Four of the eleven
state moral rights statutes contain an exception for works created within
the scope of employment. Connecticut and Nevada expressly exclude
these works from their "work of fine art" definitions,3 2 whereas Massa-
chusetts and New Mexico exclude these works under the definition of
",artist.",33
In each of the subject matter subcategories, some state statutes ex-
tend the scope beyond that articulated under VARA. No state statute,
however, is superior to VARA in all subcategories. Each statute has spe-
cific strengths and limitations. Nevertheless, this diversity among the
state statutes offers the opportunity to explore new combinations of
rights and the subsequent effects these rights will have on artists and
related industries.
II
The Scope of Moral Rights Protection
Both VARA and the state statutes recognize, in varying degrees of
specificity and comprehensiveness, the two basic moral rights of attribu-
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s(2); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:2155(D); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(4); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.970(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-7; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(d); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2107(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-5(d).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 101; CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.970(3).
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2155(D); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(4); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.970(3); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-7; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW
§ 14.03(3)(d); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-5(d).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s(2).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116S(2); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.970(3).
33. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(A).
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tion and respect.34 The right of attribution is the right of the author to
control the association of his or her name with the work. The right of
respect is the right of the author to have his or her work treated as a
work that embodies the personality of the author and accurately com-
municates through time the vision and concept of the author. Thus, the
right of attribution encompasses more than merely the right to have the
author's name associated with the work, and the right of respect encom-
passes more than the right to ensure the physical integrity of the work.
The general right of attribution, for example, encompasses the right
either to remain anonymous or to use a pseudonym, and the right of
respect encompasses the right to control the fidelity of reproductions. As
a whole, the state statutes more completely embody the basic rights of
attribution and respect.
In order to obtain a clearer picture of the differences between VARA
and the state statutes, it is necessary to break down the basic rights of
attribution and integrity into subrights. The right of attribution can be
broken down into the following subrights: (1) the subright to claim au-
thorship, (2) the subright to disclaim authorship, (3) the subright to pre-
vent the use of the author's name in connection with his or her work (i.e.
the right to prevent attribution), (4) the subright of anonymity, and (5)
the subright to use a pseudonym. The right of respect can be broken
down into the following subrights: (1) the subright against physical acts
either done to the work itself or to a reproduction of the work (i.e. the
right against modification), (2) the subright against destruction, (3) the
subright against unfaithful reproduction, and (4) the subright against
acts-other than physical acts and unfaithful reproductions-that distort
the accuracy of the author's communication through the work, such as
improper presentation (i.e. the right against distortion).
The state statutes provide more comprehensive protection of the
right of integrity by recognizing the subright against unfaithful reproduc-
tion, which is absent in VARA. State statutes also provide broader pro-
tection under the subrights embodied in the right of attribution.
A. The Right of Respect
VARA and all eleven state statutes recognize the subright against
modification. 35 Under VARA, however, this subright requires an inten-
34. The right of respect is termed the "right of integrity" in both state and federal stat-
utes. These terms are used interchangeably throughout the rest of this article.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
116t(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(1); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(c); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.974(l); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:24A-4; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(A); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3.
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tional act as well as prejudice to the author's honor or reputation.36
Under at least two state statutes, the subright against modification is vio-
lated by an act of gross negligence. 37 Three other state statutes provide
that the subright is violated by any physical defacement of the work,
whether or not it affects the author's honor or reputation.38 Some states
also extend the subright against modification to reproductions. 39 The
subright against modification embodied in VARA, however, is broader
than some state statutes, which require that the work be divulged to the
public in some manner," that the work be associated with the author,4"
and that damage to the author's reputation be at least likely.42
VARA and some state statutes recognize the subright against de-
struction. In VARA, this subright is restricted to works "of recognized
stature, '4 3 whereas in the state statutes the restriction applies to works
"of recognized quality."" Most state statutes, however, do not recognize
the subright against destruction. Neither VARA nor the states that rec-
ognize the subright against destruction inquire into the effect the destruc-
tion may have on the artist's honor or reputation.45 Arguably, the state
statutes recognizing the subright against destruction are broader than
VARA because "recognized quality" is more inclusive than "recognized
stature."
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
37. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(c); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(A).
38. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t(a); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(c).
39. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.974(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 14.03(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3.
40. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 598.974(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-7; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(A);
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2110; R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 5-62-3.
41. All states, except New Mexico, that require public disclosure as a prerequisite for
invoking the right of respect also require that the work be associated with the artist. Unlike
the other states, New Mexico also grants the artist an express right to claim and receive credit
under a pseudonym. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(B). These refinements in the New
Mexico statute make a finer distinction between the right of respect and the right of
attribution.
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 598.974(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW
§ 14.03(1).
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B); see supra text accompanying note 17.
44. CAL. CiV. CODE § 987(b)(2); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(7); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 85S(b); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2(B); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2102.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3)(B); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2152(4).
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Although the subright against unfaithful reproduction is not found
in VARA, it is recognized in six states.46 Those states that provide for a
subright against unfaithful reproduction, however, require that the re-
production be divulged to the public in some manner. 47 Five of the six
states provide protection only where there is a reasonable likelihood of
damage to the artist's reputation.48
Arguably, only VARA includes the subright against distortion. The
right of integrity uses the word "distort, ' 49 and the wording of the public
presentation exception to the right implies that grossly negligent public
presentation may violate the right of integrity. ° According to this inter-
pretation, VARA would provide broader protection since none of the
state statutes uses the word "distort" and none mentions public
presentation.
B. The Right of Attribution
VARA and all eleven state statutes recognize the subright to claim
authorship, but some states impose a requirement of public divulgation.5"
Nevertheless, both the subright to claim authorship and the subright to
disclaim authorship are fundamental subrights within the right of
attribution.
It is difficult, however, to compare VARA and the state statutes re-
garding the subright to disclaim authorship and the subright to prevent
attribution. All the states except Connecticut provide for the subright to
disclaim authorship,52 while only VARA recognizes the subright to pre-
vent attribution.5" The question is: What is the meaning of "disclaim?"
Arguably, "disclaim" means that the author has the option to have his
name associated with the work as long as there is an appropriate dis-
claimer. She may, for example, prefer to have a physically modified
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.974(l); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 14.03(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3.
47. Id.
48. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 598.974(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW
§ 14.03(1).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
50. Id. § 106A(c).
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(3),(4); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-4, :24A-7; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2), (3)(e); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2103, 2110; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3.
52. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154(C); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303(3); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(d); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.972(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(B); N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2103; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-4(a).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B); see id. § 106A(a)(2).
19931
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
painting labeled: "by Jane Doe (altered version)." Therefore, the sub-
right to prevent attribution would be more narrow than the subright to
disclaim authorship. On the other hand, it could be argued that the sub-
right to prevent attribution allows the author to insist that the work not
be attributed to him or her. The question is further complicated by the
statutes of some states which declare that the right to prevent attribution
is the right to disclaim authorship.54
Assuming that the subright to disclaim authorship and the subright
to prevent attribution are coextensive, the state statutes provide broader
protection because almost all the states permit the exercise of the sub-
right to disclaim for a "just and valid reason."" VARA, on the other
hand, limits the subright to prevent attribution to two instances: (1)
where the author did not create the work, and (2) where the right of
integrity has been violated.56
VARA provides more protection than the state statutes regarding
the subright to remain anonymous and the subright to use a pseudonym.
According to House Report 514, these subrights are included in VARA
despite the failure of VARA to expressly mention them.57 There is no
indication that any state statute recognizes the subright of anonymity,
but Massachusetts and New Mexico expressly recognize the subright to
use a pseudonym.5"
C. Other Provisions Affecting Moral Rights
VARA and the state statutes may also be compared regarding dura-
tion of rights, waiver, works in buildings, joint works, and express excep-
tions. In the aggregate, the state statutes provide more protection than
VARA in these areas.
Unlike the state statutes, VARA expressly limits its moral rights to
the life of the author.5 9 Five states expressly recognize a "life-plus-fifty"
term;60 the remaining states are silent. It may be argued that, since the
54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154(C); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(3).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(d); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154(C); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, § 303(3); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(d); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 598.972(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(B); N.Y. ARTS &
CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(2); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2103; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-4(a).
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(B); see id. § 106A(a)(2).
57. "Proposed section 106A(a)(1) creates a right of attribution that extends not only to
the right to be identified as the author of a work, or to prevent use of the author's name when
he or she is improperly identified as the author of a work of visual art, but also to the right to
publish anonymously or under a pseudonym." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 16, at 14.
58. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(d); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(B).
59. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
60. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t(d)(1); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(g); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(E); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2107(1).
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states that are silent about duration also require a likelihood of damage
to reputation, the moral rights terminate at the author's death.6'
Under the provisions of VARA, artists may waive their moral rights
in a signed writing that specifically identifies the works and uses, even
though these rights may not be transferred.62 Six states also recognize
written waivers, but none of these states requires the identification of spe-
cific uses.6" The remaining states are silent about waivers, suggesting
that moral rights may be waived. 6'
Additionally, works of art incorporated into buildings receive indi-
vidualized attention under VARA and the statutes of six states.65 If the
work of art cannot be removed from a building without substantial physi-
cal defacement or alteration, the general rule under VARA and the state
statutes is that the artist waives her right of integrity unless she expressly
reserves it in a writing signed by the owner of the building.66 On the
other hand, if the work of art can be removed from the building without
substantial harm, the artist retains the right of integrity until the owner
makes a good faith attempt to notify the artist of the intended removal
and the artist fails to respond in a timely fashion.67
VARA also contains express exceptions for the passage of time, the
inherent nature of the materials, conservation, and public presentation.68
Aside from public presentation, these exceptions appear in the state stat-
utes. In addition, express exceptions exist in the state statutes for both
the medium of reproduction and framing.69
61. At common law, for example, the dead cannot be defamed. See W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, at 778 (5th ed. 1984).
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e).
63. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(g)(3); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t(d)(3); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(g); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.976; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(E);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2107(2).
64. In American law, alienability is presumed.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d); CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(h); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t(e);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S(h); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(F), (G); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 73, § 2108.
66. See id.
67. Five of the six statutes contain express provisions to this effect. Connecticut, however,
is silent on this aspect, possibly indicating an implicit understanding that the artist's right of
respect remains inviolate if the work of art can be removed from the building without substan-
tial harm.
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c).
69. For example, the California statute contains an express exception for a person who
frames, conserves, or restores a work of fine art. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(2).




As a whole, the state statutes extend moral rights protection to more
kinds of works than VARA. For example, although Massachusetts limits
protection to works "of recognized quality," it protects motion pic-
tures-a category of work specifically excluded under VARA.7° Further-
more, despite the requirements of public disclosure and damage to
reputation, several states protect reproductions.71
On balance, the scope of moral rights protection is broader in the
state statutes than in VARA. For example, in almost all the states the
artist may disclaim authorship as long as she has a "just and valid rea-
son," while under VARA the subright to prevent attribution may be ex-
ercised only if either the work is not the artist's or the artist's right of
respect has been violated. More significantly, several states recognize the
subright against unfaithful reproduction.72
Clearly, the artist who lives in a state without a moral rights statute
is better off because of VARA; however, depending on the work and the
right asserted, the artist may get the most protection in one of the eleven
states with moral rights statutes. However, the doctrine of preemption
may preclude the artist from taking advantage of a state's moral rights
statute.
A prior version of VARA stated that state moral rights statutes
would not be preempted "except to the extent that such ...statutes
would diminish or prevent" the exercise of federal moral rights. 73 In-
stead, VARA contains a provision that closely tracks the preemption pro-
vision for § 106 rights under the Copyright Act of 1976. There are,
however, at least three arguments that support an approach to preemp-
tion for moral rights that is more narrow than preemption for § 106
rights. First, the language of the VARA preemption provision is not as
broad as the § 106 preemption provision.74 Second, the VARA preemp-
tion provision provides a specific exception for rights "which extend be-
yond the life of the author."75 Third, since Congress relied on the state
statutes to demonstrate United States compliance with the moral rights
provisions of the Berne Convention, it would be absurd for Congress to
70. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 85S(b); 17 U.S.C. § 101.
71. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2153(2); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303(2); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.974(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-4; N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF.
LAW § 14.03(1); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3.
72. See id.
73. Version in the author's personal file.
74. For example, the VARA provision does not contain the phrase "within the general
scope of copyright." See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
75. Id. § 301(f)(2)(C).
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pass a federal moral rights statute that weakened the moral rights protec-
tion available in the United States.
VARA and the state statutes combined do not produce the kind of
moral rights protection envisioned by article 6bis of the Berne Conven-
tion.76 Hopefully, courts will not lessen the sum-total of moral rights
protection in the United States by a draconian preemption analysis.
76. See The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24,
1971, art. 6bis (Paris Revision), reprinted in SAN RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 456 (1987).
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